Tiered Entities and Sovereign Privileges
Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
INTRODUCTION

Sovereign immunity originated in an age when the ruler, who was
identified with the state, "was above the law" and "claims of individuals
were sacrificed in the national interest." 1 Traditionally, foreign
immunity extended to foreign public property2 and state-owned
commercial property,3 but not to state-owned corporate entities.4 As
foreign governments increasingly competed in commercial activities,5
courts sometimes extended immunity to a state-owned corporation's
public activities, 6 but not to a government's commercial activities. 7

1. Note, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148,
1148 (1954).
2. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812) (granting immunity to government warship).
3. See Berrizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (granting
immunity in libel in rem action brought against a ship owned by Italy, but used in
commercial trade); The Miapo, 252 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (granting immunity
to Chilean naval ship charted by private individual for commercial purposes).
4. See supra note 1, at 1152. See Hannes v. Kingdom of Romania Monopolies
Inst., 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), reh'g denied, 24 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1940), order resettled, 26 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940); United States
v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. Cir. 1929). Under the
separate entity rule a suit against a foreign-government owned corporation is not a suit
against the government stockholder. Id. at 202. See infra text accompanying notes 3241.
5. MICHAEL W. GORDON, Foreign State Immunity in Commercial Transactions
§ 2.01, at 2-1 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6-7 (1976) .
6. See Dunlap v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Supp. Ct.
1943).
7. See Premier S.S. Co. v. Embassy of Algeria, 336 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria Genereal de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934
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Such distinctions left litigants with "no firm standards" as to when a
valid assertion of sovereign immunity was appropriate. 8
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act9
(the "FSIA" or "the Act") to provide remedial procedures that would
balance the rights of American plaintiffs against those of foreign state
entities. 10 In general, Congress intended the Act to codify the "restrictive" theory 11 of sovereign immunity via the commercial activity exception.12 Yet, in a departure from traditional practice the Act confers
state status upon foreign-owned corporations, 13 unless certain exceptions apply. 14
The Act grants state status upon any "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state." 15 Section 16O3(b) defines an "agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state" as any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country. 16

(1965).
8. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7.
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 144l(d), 1602-11 (1994) [hereinafter "the FSIA"
or "the Act"] .
10. "The purpose of the proposed legislation ... is to provide when and how
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities ... and to provide
when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6.
Prior to the Act there were no "comprehensive provisions" to inform parties when they
could assert a legal claim in court against a foreign state. Id. at 7.
11. The restrictive theory differentiates between governmental activities (jure
imperii) and commercial activities (jure gestionis). Foreign sovereigns are immune from
claims based onjure imperii acts whilejure gestionis acts do not generate immunity. See
generally GORDON, supra note 5, § 4.01, at 4-3 to 4-4 (explaining the adoption of the
restrictive theory by the State Department when making immunity request to the courts).
The House Report states "the immunity of foreign states is 'restricted' to suits involving
a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its
commercial or private acts (jure gestionis)." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7. See infra text
accompanying notes 47-48.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). A foreign sovereignty will not be extended immunity
if the "action is based upon a commercial activity ...." Id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1033(a)-(b)(3).
14. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1605-07.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) states: "(a) A 'foreign state,' except as used in section
1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b)."
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(l)-(3) (emphasis added). While courts have generally
applied § 1603 to entities, they have applied it to an individual acting in an official
capacity. Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts
have also applied § 1603 to an international organization. International Ass'n of
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Under§ 1603(b), courts have permitted vertically removed corporations
having "tiered" ownership interests 17 to claim foreign state status. 18
"Tiering" has allowed remote corporations competing in the commercial
sector to gain either of two distinct advantages: immunity or the
procedural benefits of the FSIA. 19

Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting States, 477 F. Supp 553 (C.D. Cal
1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1163 (1982). For an analysis of the FSIA as applied to international organizations, see
Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations in United State's Courts:
Absolute or Restrictive, 14 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1991).
17. Under tiering, defendant corporations trace back ownership through majorityowned intermediaries to a foreign sovereignty. Darryl Van Duch, When Does a
Sovereign State Control a Company?, NAT'L L.J., April 1, 1996, at Bl. Courts have
consistently allowed "pooling," under which a defendant corporation "pools" multiple
minority stakes of foreign governments to establish the requisite majority interest. E.g.,
LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1440 (E.D. Va. 1988).
18. Straub v. A.P. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing fullyowned corporation owned by "a Crown Corporation of the Province of Quebec" as an
instrumentality of a foreign state); America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877
F.2d 793, 795-96 & n.2 (9th. Cir. 1989) (stating that foreign state definition under
§ 1603(a) includes "wholly-owned subsidiary" owned by corporation 100% owned by
Republic of Ireland); Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d 425, 426-27 (7th
Cir. 1993) (conferring foreign state status upon subsidiary of parent company whose
stock was 90% owned by government of France); O'Connell Machinery Co., Inc. v.
M.V. "Americana," 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086
(1984) (recognizing company as an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of Italy
because of the Italian government's doubled-tiered stock ownership interest); Delgado
v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding defendant Dead
Sea Bromine Co. Ltd. to be an agency or instrumentality of Israel because Israel
indirectly owned roughly two-thirds of its outstanding shares); Credit Lyonnais v. Getty
Square Assocs., 876 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (permitting French ownership
interests to be tiered and pooled through an intermediate entity to establish majority
ownership); Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(conferring foreign state status on corporation because of the Italian government's tripletiered stock ownership interest through two separate entities); Trump Taj Mahal v.
Costuzioni Aeronautiche Geovanni, 761 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958
F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992) (recognizing defendant
corporation as a foreign state whose link to Italian government was triple-tiered);
Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultant, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1409, 1411-12 (D. Or.
1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 903 (1992)
(recognizing corporation that was entity of a holding company founded with the backing
of the Peoples Republic of China as an agency or instrumentality under the FSIA);
Rutkowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 83 C 2339, 1988 WL 107342, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 5, 1988) (conferring foreign state status on defendant Asbestos Corporation, Ltd.
after tracing ownership through two intermediate corporations back to Canada).
19. See infra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
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In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,20 Alberta Pork, a Canadian government supported entity, owned Fletcher's Fine Foods ("FFF''), a Canadian
pork processing plant. FFF in tum owned Golden Gate Fresh Foods
("GGFF"), a pork processing plant located in California. Former
employees of GGFF brought suit relating to their termination and
cancellation of benefits against GGFF, FFF, and Alberta Pork. Alberta
Pork and FFF claimed immunity under § 1603. The Ninth Circuit
became the first circuit to hold that an entity (FFF) owned by a foreign
agency (Alberta Pork) was not entitled to FSIA protection.
The Gates decision's importance increases as more American
individuals and businesses encounter foreign entities. States utilize
multitudinous ownership interests to protect national industries, promote
commercial products, fill market voids, raise capital, and support
political ideologies. Even with the recent popularity of privatizing
government entities, state-owned entities continue to be "regular
participants in commercial markets." 21 The organizational matrix of
such entities has risen in complexity and configuration. Consequently,
tiering disputes "will become increasingly commonplace as more U.S.
industries go global." 22 Tiering, moreover, may place United States
manufacturers at a "competitive disadvantage" if their competitors can
get "FSIA removal and jury immunity, while they cannot." 23
This Comment argues that the language and policies of the FSIA do
not support tiering. Part I reviews the evolution of foreign state
immunity within the United States. Part II discusses benefits conferred
by the FSIA and analyzes the policies supported by the Act and by the
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. Part III discusses recent case
developments regarding tiering, in particular the Gates decision. Part IV
analyzes § 1603 and argues that the Gates court properly ruled against
tiering. Part V recommends that courts should interpret the definition of
a "foreign state" in light of the history and policies of foreign sovereign

20. 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995).
21. David Zaslowsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1996, at 1; see Abdullahm Al-Obaidan & Gerald W. Scully,
Efficiency Differences Between Private and State-owned Enterprises in the International
Petroleum Industry, 24 APPLIED ECONOMICS 237 (1992) (noting that two-thirds of
foreign firms in the Fortune 500 list are owned wholly or in part by the state); Andrew
Tanze, The China Bubble, FORBES, May 8, 1995, at 46 (noting that in China there are
100,000 state-owned enterprises employing 110 million workers); Mark L. Clifford &
Joyce Barnathan, Beijing is Buying Hong Kong-But at its Own Price, BUSINESS WEEK,
May 13, 1996, at 64 (noting the forced share sale of a British airline to the Chinese
government puts other companies on notice of China's "nationalization through the stock
market").
22. Van Duch, supra note 17, at B 1.
23. Id.
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immunity. Part V also recommends that the legislature amend § 1603
to properly implement their original purpose, the codification of the
restrictive theory.
I.
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF lMMUNITY

The Absolute Immunity Doctrine

Within the United States, foreign sovereign immunity evolved from
the 1812 Supreme Court case, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. 24
The unanimous Court held that a French warship within United States
waters was immune from libel and arrest, notwithstanding the American
plaintiffs' claim that it had been pirated from them on the high seas. 25
Although the issue of immunity involved a government warship, Chief
Justice Marshall acknowledged a distinction between public and private
sovereign acts. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
Without indicating any opinion on the question...there is a manifest difference
between the private property of the person who happens to be a prince, and the
military force which supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity
and independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a
foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the
territorial jurisdiction.
.

Nevertheless, in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro27 the Supreme
Court quickly noted that the difference between a government warship

24. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
25. Id. at 147. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can
be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be
extended to him.
Id. at 137.
Sovereign Immunity, as stated by Marshall, is a voluntary waiver, for policy reasons,
of absolute territorial power that can be withdrawn at anytime with advanced notice.
Thomas H. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 164-65 (1981).
26. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145.
27. 271 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1926).
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and merchant ship was "not of special significance." 28 In the libel in
rem action, the Court extended immunity to a commercial merchant ship
owned by the Italian government. Thus, the Court confirmed the
"absolute rule of state immunity." 29 A foreign state and its property
would be immune from jurisdiction, absent its consent. 30 The Court
reasoned that a country's public acts included "advancing the trade of its
people," "producing revenue for its treasury" and "maint[aining] and
advanc[ing] the economic welfare of a people."31
B.

The Separate Entity Doctrine

Twelve years after the Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court
established the separate entity rule in Bank of the United States v. The
Planter's Bank of Georgia, 32 that state-owned corporations are discrete
personalities that can not claim sovereign status based upon their
sovereign owners. 33 In Planters, the bank asserted that its state stock
ownership vested Eleventh Amendment immunity rights. In refusing the
bank's assertion, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
The Planters' Bank of Georgia is not the State of Georgia, although the State
holds an interest in it. It is, we think, a sound principle that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as
concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character . . . it
descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself. . . .34

Nearly 100 years later, the New Jersey Superior Court in Molina v.
Commission Regulardora Del Mercado De Henequen 35 applied the
separate entity doctrine in the international context. Conceptually, courts
viewed a foreign corporation as having "its own independent juridical
personality" whose "business and purpose was private." 36 Courts

28. Id. at 573. (statement refers to The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, which the Court had extensively quoted).
29. GAMAL BOURSI BADR, STATE IMMUNITY AN ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC
VIEW 36 (1984).
30. Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1086, 1087 (1965).
31. Berizzi Bros. Co., 271 U.S. at 574.
32. 22 U.S. (Wheat) 904 (1824).
33. See id. at 907; William C. Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in International
Perspective: Should State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for
Immunity Purposes?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 535, 542-43 (1991).
34. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. at 907.
35. Molina v. Commission Regulardora Del Mercado De Henequen, 103 A. 397,
399 (N.J. 1918) (stating that it's a "startling" proposition that defendant corporation of
the State of Yucatan be granted immunity).
36. In The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 248, 261 (D.C. Mass. 1941).
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denied immunity to corporations closely controlled by foreign states, 37
corporations partly operating in a governmental capacity, 38 and to
corporations that contributed to the wealth of the foreign state. 39 In
The Beaton Park, 40 the court noted that foreign state-owned corporations should not be treated more favorably with respect to sovereign
immunity than our own Govemment. 41

37. Coale v. Societe Co-Operative Suisse Des Charbons, 21 F.2d 180, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding foreign state-owned corporation not immune even though
seven out of 17 directors were appointed by the government; the charter, amendments,
and rules were to be approved by the government; and partial profits were paid to the
government); United States v. Deutshes Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 200
(S.D.N.Y. 1929) (holding corporation not immune even though it had a government
controlled board, and France owned eleven-fifteenths of its capital stock).
38. Deutshes Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d at 200-01 (ruling corporation
selling potash from government mines with proceeds going to the Republic of France for
governmental purposes not immune). "A suit against a corporation is not a suit against
a government merely because it ... is used as a governmental agent, and its stock is
owned solely by the government." Id. Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. International
Sales Corp., 204 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013
(N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (ruling Republic of Turkey state enterprise that contracted to
purchase meat for the Turkish army was not performing a public act). But see Dunlap
v. Banco Central Del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650, 650-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943) (ruling
corporation whose stock was five-elevenths owned by Ecuador government immune
because contract in suit to mint coins was solely a public duty).
39. Molina, 103 A. at 399.
40. 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1946).
41. Id. at 212.
In this country . . . when our Government enters upon an ordinary
commercial business undertaking . . . it does so under the same liabilities as
private individuals ....
[N]o sound principle of law or of international comity requires that the courts
of this country treat a foreign government more favorably as to sovereign
immunity than our own Government is treated by the courts.
Id.
Domestic sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign immunity are based on different
theories. Domestic immunity originates from the impracticability of coercing the state
into its own court. This led to the principle that the state is above the law. Hill, supra
note 25, at 158-59. Foreign immunity emanates from principles of comity and reciprocal
favors among countries. Ulen & Co. v. Bank of Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N.Y.S.2d
201, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), appeal denied, 25 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div.
1941).
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C.

The Restrictive Theory

Courts often considered the question of immunity as a "political rather
'than judicial matter." 42 Dating back to The Schooner Exchange, the
Executive Branch regularly made recommendations to the courts for or
against immunity.43 Courts generally conceded to the Executive
Branch's determination to confer immunity upon a corporation. 44
After World War II, American businesses interacted with state-owned
entities "on a scale never dreamed of at the time of [The Schooner
Exchange] decision."45 Americans increasingly sought the protection
of the courts to resolve legal disputes arising from these encounters. In
response to a suit, foreign governments often made diplomatic requests
of immunity to the Department of State. The State Department reexamined its approach in recommending immunity because of "the
growing role of state agencies in international trade .... " 46 In 1952,
the Tate letter47 expressed that the State Department would employ the
restrictive theory when making recommendations of immunity to the
courts. 48 Sovereign acts that were jure imperii (public) would be
recommended for immunity, but jure gestionis acts (private) would not.

42. Et Ve Batik Kurumu, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
43. The Executive department filed a request in favor of immunity. However,
Chief Justice Marshall did not consider the request in his opinion. The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 118 (1812). In 1812, the Executive
favored immunity because "foreign policy required amity with France in anticipation of
warfare with its bitter enemy Great Britain." BADR, supra note 29, at 14.
44. Et Ve Batik Kurumu, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 974. See also, F.W. Stone Engineering
Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico, 42 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1945) (ruling government of
Mexico's profit generating commercial enterprise immune based upon State
Department's recommendation). "Nor is it of any significance that the governmental
instrumentality is a separate corporation. A determination by the Secretary of State with
respect to the status of such instrumentality is . . . binding upon the courts of this
country ...." Id. at 60. The Supreme Court relinquished international law in favor of
foreign policy suggestions from the Executive Branch due to separation of powers. This
practice reached its nadir in Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) and
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
45. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.C.N.Y.
1962), appeal dismissed, 313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963).
46. Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
in Prospective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986).
47. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) (writing from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Philip B. Perlaman, Acting Attorney General (May
19, 1952)).
48. See generally GORDON, supra note 5, § 4.02, at 4-5 to 4-10 (explaining the
evolution of State Department's determination process into a quasi-judicial hearing that
occasionally usurped the court's function). But see Michael H. Cardozo, Sovereign
Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 613-15 (1954)
(asserting that the State Department should hold formal hearings).
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Nevertheless, when foreign relations demanded, the State Department
recommended immunity in disputes involving commercial acts and the
courts abdicated. 49 Courts also noted the difficulty in drawing the line
between commercial and sovereign acts. 50 The practice of deciding
cases by either the State Department employing foreign policy considerations or the courts applying international law developed "considerable
uncertainty" for private parties. 51 This bifurcated arrangement resulted
in an "incoherent body of rules claiming legal status, but manipulated for
political ends, and lacking essential attributes of law, such as certainty,
generality, and neutrality."52
II.

THE

FSIA: PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AND POLICIES
A.

Procedural Protections

The FSIA provides "comprehensive provisions" to inform parties when
they can assert a legal claim against a foreign state. 53 Previously,
courts generally denied immunity to foreign state-owned corporations. 54

49. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (recognizing
immunity upon State Department's recommendation on behalf of commercial vessel two
days after Cuba released hijacked American airplane); Ibrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v.
President of India, 446 F. 2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971) (granting immunity in breach of
contract suit pursuant to the State Department's recommendation); Chemical Nat'l
Resource, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864, 877 (Pa. 1966) (granting
immunity in breach of commercial contract dispute based on the State Department's
recommendation); see also Hill, supra note 25, at 173-80 (asserting that restrictive theory
is not closely followed in the majority of State Department decisions).
50. See Victory Tansport, Inc. v. Comisaria Genereal de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting some courts looked at the nature
of the act, classifying those acts that could not be performed by private individuals as
sovereign acts, while other courts examined the purpose of the act to determine if its
objective was public in character).
51. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 9 (1976). "The courts had begun to rely quite
heavily on the practices and policies of the State Department and to place less emphasis
on whether immunity was supported by the law and practice of nations, that is,
international law." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum
Exporting States, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
52. Hill, supra note 25, at 178. But see Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Deference
to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper,
48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 461-62 (1963) (asserting judicial deference acknowledges the
Executive's right and does not surrender judicial responsibilities).
53. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 6.
54. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
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The FSIA, however, presumes state-owned corporations should be
granted immunity, 55 unless an exception applies. 56 Even if an exception applies, the Act, by extending sovereign status beyond the state to
corporations under § 1603, confers sovereign procedural privileges to
commercial entities. 57 Once qualified as an "agency or instrumentality"
under § 1603(b), the Act "provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction . . .. " 58 Therefore, tiering majority ownership back to a
foreign sovereignty becomes the preeminent task for any indirectly stateowned corporation.
For a litigant who unexpectingly opposes a tiered corporation, 59 the
Act's procedural maze 60 can be insurmountable. 61 First, once a
corporation establishes prima facia evidence of immunity, the burden of
proof shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that an exception applies. 62

55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a)-(b)(3), 1604 (1994).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07. Section 1605(a)(2) which concerns commercial
activities is "the most significant of the FSIA's exceptions." Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 610 (1992). The most frequently raised immunity
exception is the commercial activity exception. De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicar.,
770 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1985). The federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction only if an exception applies. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b). Also,
personal jurisdiction requires service of process in compliance with § 1608. Id.
57. See generally Hoffman, supra note 33, at 565-84 (critiquing § 1603's
consequences of conferring sovereign status on commercial entities and its malalignment
with international trends).
58. Argentine Republic v. Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
59. Cf. Gould, Inc. v. Penchiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding the time to determine whether a tiered corporation is a "foreign state" is
the time of the act); but see Straub v. A.P. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994)
(ruling FSIA applicable if tiered corporation is a "foreign state" at time suit is filed, even
if it was not state-owned at time of alleged wrong-doing); Ocasek v. Flinkote Co., 796
F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (holding the time to determine whether a tiered
corporation is a "foreign state" is the time of the suit). For changed status corporations,
see generally Rebecca J. Simmons, Nationalized and Denationalized Commercial
Enterprises Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2278
(1990).
60. See Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (describing the FSIA as a "labyrinth ... [with] numerous interpretive questions
engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions .... ").
"[T]he matrix of complex conditions has caused the FSIA to achieve the heights of
confusion heretofore achieved only by the Internal Revenue Code." GORDON, supra note
5, § 4.03, at 4-26.
61. See O'Connel Machinery Co., Inc. v. M.V. "Americana," 734 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984) (dismissing suit because vessel immune
from attachment under FSIA); America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877
F.2d 793, 796-800 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing suit because FSIA's commercial exception
not applicable); Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1287-89
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1201 (1994) (dismissing two parent corporations
from suit because commercial activity exception inapplicable).
62. See, e.g., Gould, Inc., 853 F.2d at 451-52; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17
(1976).

1826

[VOL. 34: 1817, 1997]

Immunities Act
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Then, the defendant entity must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the exception does not apply.
Second, the Act provides special requirements for service of process
upon a foreign agency or instrumentality. 63 A plaintiff who fails to
strictly comply with the service provision carries the burden of proving
that he "substantially complied," that the defendant received actual
notice, and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of
compliance. 64 Delivery of the complaint in the incorrect language fails
the "substantial compliance" test. 65
Third, a tiered corporation gaining foreign state status can remove any
civil action to federal comi, at any time for cause shown. 66 The action
can be removed regardless of the presence of non-diverse defendants. 67
Moreover, the Act's time limitations for removal are more liberal than
the requirements under federal question and diversity jurisdiction. 68
Courts have permitted untimely removal to "provide a federal forum ...
in the interest of comity." 69 One court permitted a tiered corporation
to remove the case after four months. 70 The FSIA also preempts claimspecific federal laws that prohibit removal. 71 Cases removed to federal
court proceed without a jury. 72 Every court of appeals to consider the

63. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (1994). Requirements for service of process upon a
foreign state or a political subdivision of a foreign state are different than the
requirements for service upon an agency or instrumentality. Id. § 1608(a).
64. Straub, 38 F.3d at 453-54.
65. Id. at 453.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(d).
67. Trump Taj Mahal v. Costuzioni Aeronautiche Geovanni, 761 F. Supp. 1143;
1146 (D.N.J. 1991), ajf'd, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826
(1992). Removal is permissible "even if there are multiple defendants and some of these
defendants desire not to remove the action or are citizens of the State in which the action
has been brought." Id. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
69. Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 355 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
70. Id. at 354-55. See Refco, Inc. v. Galadari, 755 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (allowing removal after five years after limited activity in state court to effectuate
the FSIA's policy of uniformity of law); but see Dehart v. A.C. & S., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
792, 794-95 (D. Del. 1988) (denying removal after more than four years).
71. Talbot, 835 F. Supp. at 355 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) which prohibits
removal of civil actions brought in State court under the Jones Act does not preclude
removal by a state-owned entity under the FSIA).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
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question has held that the Act's prohibition against jury trials does not
violate the Seventh Amendment. 73
Fourth, plaintiffs trying to gain jurisdiction over a corporate defendant
under the commercial activity exception face additional hurdles. 74 If
the commercial activity75 occurred within the United States, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a nexus between the defendant's commercial activity
and the claim. 76 The claim must ·be "based upon" a commercial
activity having "substantial contact with the United States."77 Therefore, the nexus requirement may not be satisfied by "doing business"
contacts under many long-arm statutes. 78 If the commercial activity
occurs outside the United States, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's actions caused a substantial "direct effect" on the plaintiff
and that the "direct effect" occurred in the United States. 79 There must
be an "immediate consequence of the defendant's ... activity." 80 A
corporate plaintiff who suffers "direct" financial hardship must "be

73. Universal Consol. Cos., Inc. v. Bank of China, 35 F.3d 243, 245-46 (6th Cir.
1994); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 761 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 995 (1985); Ruggiero v. Compania Pervana De Bapores "Inca Capac
Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Shipping Corp. oflndia, 653
F.2d 875, 881-83 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Rex v. CIA.
Pervanna De Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1981); see Jason Weedon, Note,
Historically Immune Defendants and the 7th Amendment, 74 TEX L. REV. 655, 669-77
(1996) (analyzing the reasoning of the circuit courts' opinions upholding the denial of
jury trials under the FSIA).
74. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity Part II, 85 COM. L.J. 228, 230-33 (1980) (noting the
difficulties in interpreting and applying the commercial activity exception).
75. A foreign state's activity is considered commercial if a private party could
engage in a similar activity. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,614
(1992).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994); America West Airlines v. GPA Group, Ltd.,
877 F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1989) (dismissing case after plaintiff failed to show that
the defendant's commercial activity was the basis of the suit); Gates v. Victor Fine
Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995)
(defendant Alberta Pork's acts of selling hogs and owning subsidiary umelated to former
subsidiary employees' claims concerning termination of benefits and employment).
77. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356 (1993) (interpreting "based upon"
stringent!y).
78. Gould Inc. v. Penchiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988).
79. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1991),
ajf'd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
80. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. at 618. But see David E. Gohlke, Comment, Cleaning
the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining "a Direct Effect in the United States" Under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, 18 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 261, 279-84 (1995) (criticizing the effect of Weltover); Sarah K. Schano,
Note, The Scatter Remains of Sovereign Immunity for States After Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover: Due Process Protection or Nothing, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 697714 (1994) (analyzing the problems encountered by lower courts when applying
Weltover).
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placed in financial peril as an immediate consequence of the defendant's
unlawful activity." 81

B.

Policy Considerations

In the seminal case The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall
reasoned that a domestic state voluntarily extends immunity for policy
reasons. 82 The case law history of foreign sovereign immunity reveals
various policy considerations. Also, the House Report concerning the
FSIA enumerates four objectives the Act seeks to accomplish. The Act's
legislative history reveals policies underlying these objectives. The
policies intertwined in foreign immunity and the FSIA support recent
case rulings prohibiting tiering.
Foreign sovereign immunity effectuates "comity among nations and
among the respective branches of federal government," 83 and "aid[s] in
the maintenance of friendly powers." 84 The doctrine is implemented
so as not to "embarrass the Government of the United States in its
foreign relations" 85 and to promote "public morality, fair dealing,
reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the 'power and dignity' of the
foreign sovereign. " 86
The House Report states the Act would accomplish four objectives:
"codify the . . . restrictive principle;" 87 transfer sovereign immunity
decisions "from the executive branch to the judicial branch;" 88 replace
the need for in rem jurisdiction by providing a "statutory procedure" for
in personam jurisdiction; 89 and provide prevailing plaintiffs with a

81. Weltover, Inc., 941 F.2d at 152. The court's interpretation of the "direct
effect" clause has created an anomaly in that corporations and individuals may succeed
against foreign entities for commercial acts that result in financial loss, but not for acts
resulting in personal injury. Peter Brodsky, Note, Martin v. Republic of South Africa:
Alienating Injured Americans, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 163-70 (1989).
82. Hill, supra note 25.
83. First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972).
84. Flota Martima Browning De Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad De La Habana, 335
F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1964).
85. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 213 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1946).
86. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 384 U.S. 356, 362 (1955).
87. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8.

1829

method to execute judgments against foreign states. 90 These four
objectives advance various policies.
First, the restrictive theory, by not extending immunity to commercial
or private acts, 91 encourages private transactions with foreign states by
ensuring individuals that their disputes will be adjudicated in the
courts. 92 This implies that findings of "commercial liability against
foreign states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations .... " 93
Second, the Act implements "procedures that insure due process" by
transferring immunity determinations to the judiciary. 94
Third, the Act promotes "uniformity in decision" because of the
undesirable repercussions of inconsistent decisions in cases involving
foreign sovereigns. 95 Original federal jurisdiction,96 the expanded
time limitations for removal, 97 the lack of minimum amount in controversy,98 and the prohibition of jury trials in federal court all promote
uniformity by encouraging cases to be tried in federal court without a
jury.99
Synthesizing these competing concerns facilitates an analysis of
"tiering" within the proper context. The primary policies to be balanced
include a private litigant's right to due process versus a foreign
sovereign's right to perform state activities free from the intrusion of a
lawsuit. 100 Also, the transfer of immunity determinations to the courts
and a goal of uniformity indicate a desire for predictability. Finally, the
judiciary "should not interfere with the conduct of the foreign policy of
the United States .... " 101

90. Id.
91. See supra note 11.
92. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 699
(1976) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 698.
94. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7. The State Department "does not have the
machinery to take evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review." Id. at 8.
95. Id. at 13.
96. 28 u.s.c. § 1330 (1994).
97. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
98. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13.
99. Id.
100. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria Genereal de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
101. Republic oflraq v. First Nat'l City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.C.N.Y.
1962), appeal dismissed, 313 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1963). For an analysis of the FSIA
within the context of separation of powers, see Todd Connors, Note, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Using Separation of Powers Analysis to Guide Judicial
Decision-making, 26 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 203 (1994).
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III.

THE COURTS: INDIRECT OWNERSHIP OF TIERED ENTITIES

A.

Who Owns Whom

Prior to Gates, courts have stated tiering to be "no problem" 102 and
"immaterial." 103 The courts considered any "entity 50% or more of
whose shares are owned by a foreign state is itself a foreign state." 104
Courts disregarded a parent entity's nomenclature. Consequently, courts
applied the FSIA to any foreign government majority-owned tiered
entity.
Prior to Gates, the courts' analyses of whether§ 1603 permits tiering
have lacked substance. Rather their analyses essentially concerned
uncovering ownership interests. 105 In O'Connell Machinery Co., Inc.
v. M. V. "Americana, " 106 the appellant claimed the defendant, Italian
Line, was "too remote" under § 1603. Istituto per la Ricostruzione
Industriale ("IRI"), an Italian government financial entity directly
controlled Societa' Finanziaria Marittima ("FINMARE"); FINMARE in
tum owned a majority of Italian Line's shares.

102. Allendale Mut. Ins. v. Bull Data Systems, 10 F.3d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1993).
103. Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352, 353 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
104. Linton v. Airbus lndustrie, 794 F. Supp. 650, 652 (S.D. Tex 1992), appeal
dismissed, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044 (1994). In Federal
Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993), the issue of
tiering was not in dispute. Nevertheless, Judge Greenberg believed that a "reasonable
inference might be drawn that the term 'foreign state' in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) does
not include an entity which is a foreign state only because it is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Id. at 1285 n.12. He reasoned as follows:
[l]t can be argued reasonably that Congress by the inclusion of "political
subdivision" and omission of "agency or instrumentality" in section 1603(b)(2)
intended to distinguish between these types of entities, the inference being that
the former but not the latter could own an entity which could be regarded as
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.
Id.
105. See, e.g, Linton, 794 F. Supp. at 652. The court found defendant Al not to be
a foreign state because only 49.25% of majority shares were held by foreign states: two
corporations controlled by foreign states owning 42.1 % of AI; a private corporation
owning 20% of AI; a fourth corporation, Deutsche Airbus GmbH ("DA") owning the
remaining 37 .9% of AI, DA in turn owned by 2 companies, 20% owned by an agency
of the German government and 80% owned by Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm ("MBB"),
a German corporation; foreign states owning 36.56% ofMBB and 63.44% privately held.
106. 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984).
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Whether the court considered FINMARE an agency [not explicity
within§ 1603(b)(2)] or a political subdivison of the Italian government
[explicity within § 1603(b)(2)] is far from clear. The court noted that
the "Italian government saw fit to double-tier its ... agencies." 107
Without any analysis, however, the court also stated that "FINMARE fits
comfortably within this [political subdivision] definiton." 108 Without
ever addressing the broader implications of tiering, the court simply
traced the double-tiered state-majority interest. Thus, the court granted
immunity to Italian Line even though the IRI "coordinate[d] the
management of the commercial enterprises of the Italian Govemment."109
In Trump Taj Mahal v. Costruzioni Aeronautich Giovanni, 110 the
court appropriated O'Connell's tracing of ownership reasoning. An
Italian state agency, Ente Partecipazionie Finanziamento Industria
Manifatturiera ("EFIM"), owned and controlled MCS S.p.A. MCS
S.p.A. wholly owned Aviofer Breda S.p.A. who in tum owned 98.9% of
helicopter manufacturer Augusta S.p.A., the defendant. The plaintiff
argued that the FSIA did not apply to Augusta S.p.A. because it was
"too remote."
The court record stated that EFIM is a "state owned agency," MCS
S.p.A. is a "financial operating company," and Aviofer Breda S.p.A. is
a holding company. 111 The court, nevertheless, failed to analyze
whether § 1603 permitted tiering by agencies and instrumentalities.
Instead, the court analogized Augusta's position to that of Italian Line
in O'Connell and permitted this triple-tiered arrangement. 112
America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd. 113 illustrates the
courts' easy extension of state privileges. In America West Airlines, the
court noted that defendants Aerlinte and Aer Lingus, "fall within the
definition of a 'foreign state' under section 1603(a)" because they were
wholly owned by the Republic of Ireland.11 4 Without discussion the
court then treated a subsidiary of Aer Lingus (defendant Airmotive, an
engine maintenance corporation) as a foreign state.

107. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 116-17.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. 761 F. Supp. 1143 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992).
·
111. Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 1150.
113. 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1989).
114. Id. at 796.
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The court's reasoning in Rutkowski v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 115
emphasizes blind adhesion to tiering without considering the intermediate
entity's classification. In Rutkowski, the court noted that "Quebec did
not own more than 50 percent of [defendant] ACL." 116 Yet, the court
held ACL to be an instrumentality of Canada because Quebec wholly
owned "a company (SNA) which owned 51.2 percent of a company
(Mines-S.N.A.) which owned 54.6 percent of ACL," an asbestos
supplier. 117
B.

What Owns What

Litigants disputing an entity's immunity status clash over
§ 1603(b)(2)'s "ownership clause." 118 In Gates, the Alberta Agricultural Products Marketing Council ("Council") approved regulations
issued by Alberta Pork, a marketing agent for hog producers. The
Council also authorized the methods and matters that Alberta Pork could
act upon, including Alberta Pork's acquisition of FFF. Based upon the
government Council's "active supervisory role" over Alberta Pork, the
court concluded that Alberta Pork was a "an agency or instrumentality
of the Province of Alberta." 119
Although Alberta Pork wholly owned FFF, the court did not grant FFF
foreign state status because FFF was "not owned by 'aforeign state or
political subdivision thereof . . . ."' 120 The court stated:

115. No. 83C2339, 1988 WL 107342 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1988).
116. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Sections 1603(b)(l) and 1603(b)(3) are straightforward. See supra text
accompanying notes 15-16.
119. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1460-61 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995) (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1461 (emphasis added). The Gates opinion did not mention two previous
Ninth Circuit cases that permitted tiering, Straub v. A.P. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448 (9th
Cir. 1994) and America West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th Cir.
1989). In Straub, defendant corporation Atlas Turner was owned by a Crown
Corporation of the Province of Quebec. The plaintiff did not argue that tiering was
impermissible under the Act. The plaintiff did contend that Atlas Turner was not a
foreign state because the corporation was riot an instrumentality at the time of the acts
giving rise to the suit. The court held that the FSIA did apply because Atlas Turner was
acquired by a Crown Corporation prior to the time the lawsuit was filed. Straub, 38
F.3d at 451. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14, for a discussion of America
West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd.
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One might argue that once we determine that Alberta Pork is an agency or
instrumentality, then it ipso facto becomes a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof. However, the literal language of the statute requires us to
reject that argument .... [T]he statute [1603(a)] provides that a foreign state
includes an agency or instrumentality, not that it is an agency or instrumentality
or that it is defined as an agency or instrumentality . . . . If Congress had
intended "agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state" to mean "a foreign
state" for the purposes of section 1603, then it also would have intended a
"political subdivision" to mean "a foreign state" because section 1603(a) defines
a foreign state as including both "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." 121

The court further noted that the legislative history concerning
§ 1603(b)(2) also distinguishes a foreign state from a political subdivision.122 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 1603(a)(b)(2) means that an entity whose majority interest is owned by a foreign
state (or a political subdivision of a foreign state) will be granted foreign
state status, but that the FSIA will not provide protection to an entity
whose majority interest is owned by an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof.
By distinguishing between foreign states, political subdivisions, and
agencies and instrumentalities, the court restricted the reach of § 1603.
The court's concern was that if an agency or instrumentality's majority
ownership interest conferred foreign state status on an entity, then
immunity could be granted to "any subsidiary in a corporate chain, no
matter how far down the line .... " 123
The court in Gardiner Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De
Espana, S.A. 124 followed Gates. Spain directly owned Iberia Lineas
Aereas de Espana, S.A. ("Iberia"). Iberia controlled an eighty-five
percent interest in defendant Aerolineas Argentinas. The court found
Iberia, a corporate entity, not to be a foreign state or political subdivision. In determining that Aerolineas Argentinas was owned by an
agency or instrumentality, the court stated: "[t]he interpretation of the
Act and its legislative history set forth by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Gates is straightforward and persuasive." 125 Consequently, Aerolineas Argentinas did not satisfy§ 1603(b)(2)'s ownership
requirement. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Gardiner court was concerned
about agencies and instrumentalities spreading potentially unlimited
immunity throughout the corporate network.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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896 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 130.
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C.

Rejecting Gates' Reasoning

Following Gates, passengers' estates brought wrongful death actions
after an airline crash near O'Hare International Airport in In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana ("Roselawn"). 126 They sued
the airline and related entities in state court. Avions de Transport,
Regional, G.I.E ("ATR"), the plane's manufacturer, removed the actions
to federal court under § 144l(d) of the FSIA.
ATR claimed it was a "foreign state" based upon the following
ownership structure: Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospateiale
("SNIA") owned fifty percent of ATR; SOGEPA owned twenty percent
of SNIA and the French government owned one hundred percent of
SOGEPA. The government also owned 52% of Credit Lyonnais which
owned 17.81 % of SNIA. The French government, moreover, directly
owned 62.16% of SNIA. Alenia owned the other fifty percent of ATR.
Alenia was a division of Finmeccanica S.p.A. which was sixty-two
percent owned by LR.I, a holding entity. The Italian government wholly
owned LR.I. 127
In Roselawn, the court explicitly rejected the Gates court's reasoning
point by point. First, the Roselawn court noted that a foreign state
within § 1603(a) (titled "Definitions") includes an agency or instrumentality. Second, the superfluous inclusion of political· subdivisions in
§ 1603(b)(2) did not necessarily lead to the exclusion of "agencies and
instrumentalities" within the meaning of a foreign state. Third, the court
noted that the legislative history concerning § 1603 states that only in
§ 1608 does "the term 'foreign state' refer[] only to the sovereign state
itself." 128 The court believed that Congress did not intend the term
"foreign state" in the very next section to mean only the sovereign state
itself as the Gates court interpreted the section. Finally, the court
asserted that judicial concern about expanding immunity down the
corporate chain should be left to the legislature. 129

126. 909 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1995), ajf'd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 1087. ATR also "pooled" ownership interest because neither the French
nor Italian government owned a majority interest. Id. at 1090-93.
128. Id. at 1095 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976)).
129. Id. at 1094-96.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF TIERING
A.

Foreign States, Political Subdivisions, Agencies and Instrumentalities Within the Language of the FSIA

The threshold question concerning the application of any FSIA
provision is whether an entity is a foreign state as defined by § 1603.
The FSIA applies to entities that are owned by foreign states, but it does
not "apply to entities owned by entities which are not foreign
states." 130 Thus, the issue concerning tiering is whether an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state is a foreign state.
Section 1603(a) defines a "'foreign state,' except as used in section
1608 of this title, [as] includ[ing] a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b)." 131 Section 1603(b)(2) defines an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as an entity "which is an organ of a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares ... is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof ...." 132
Dovetailing the two definitions, a "foreign state" within § 1603(b)(2)
apparently includes an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.
Consequently, courts have perceived majority state-owned intermediate
companies as agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states (their parent
companies) and as foreign states them.selves for agencies and instrumentalities (their subsidiaries). 133 This perception has greatly expanded
potential im.m.unity and the Act's procedural benefits. Remote entities,
competing in common com.m.ercial activities, can bootstrap tenuous
stacks of ownership interests back to sovereign states.
However, one can only equate an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state" with a "foreign state," as the Roselawn court did, through
circular reasoning. An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"
would mean any entity a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state." 134 Section 1603(b)(2) would define itself. Paring the section
to its minim.um. shows the unreasonableness of this position. A foreign
state would not be needed to confer foreign state status;§ 1603(b) could
130. Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 794 F. Supp. 650, 653 (S.D. Tex. 1992), appeal
dismissed, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044 (1994).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994) (emphasis added).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (emphasis added).
133. See Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995).
134. See Roselawn, 909 F. ·Supp. at 1096.
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be interpreted as an "agency or instrumentality of an agency or
instrumentality."
In addition, the phrase "or political subdivision thereof' in
§ 1603(b)(2) indicates that agencies and instrumentalities are not foreign
states. The conjunction "or" between "foreign state" and "political
subdivision thereof' reasonably indicates Congress waQted to identify the
alternative discrete groups that emanate foreign state status. 135 This
interpretation makes the phrase "political subdivision thereof' completely
necessary rather than superfluous. 136 In light of the underlying
policies, the Gates approach is clearly preferred to the circular reasoning
of the Roselawn court.
As the Rose/awn court noted, § 1603 and the pertinent legislative
history indicates that the word "foreign state" refers to the sovereign
state itself only in § 1608. However, the Act itself indicates otherwise.
The Act utilizes the terms "foreign state," "political subdivision of a
foreign state," and "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" in
various syntactic modes. The Act employs the term "foreign state"
solely, 137 with references to § 1603, 138 with references to "political
subdivisions" 139 or "agencies and instrumentalities" 140 or with references to both. 141
Section 1391(f) begins by specifically stating that the term "foreign
state" means "a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a)."142 Section
1391(f) contains four enumerated clauses concerning venue. On the one
hand, § 1391(1)-(2) treats the three groups identically. Under clause
one, the plaintiff may bring an action in any district in which "a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of property that is subject of the action is
situated." 143 Under clause two, a plaintiff may bring a claim where
"the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated .... " 144

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990).
See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1462.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(l)-(2) & 1607.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 139l(t) & 144l(d).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(t)(4) & 1608(a).
28 u.s.c. § 1605(3) & 1606.
28 U.S.C. § 1608(d)-(e).
28 U.S.C. § 139l(t).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(l).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(2).
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On the other hand, § 1391(£)(3)-(4), treats the three groups differently.
Section 1391(f)(3) states that a civil action may be brought "in any
judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do
business or is doing business .... " 145 Section 1391(f)(4) states that
a civil action may be brought "in the United States Court for the District
of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof " 146 This clause contains the identical wording as
the ownership clause in § 1603(b)(2).
One should not interpret the term "foreign state" in § 1391(f)(4) as
including "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" because every
word after "Columbia" would become superfluous. Furthermore,
Congress clearly did not have this intent. The legislative history states
that § 1391(f)(4) is limited to the foreign states and their political
subdivisions because that is where they "have diplomatic representatives
and where it may be easiest for them to defend." 147 The only reasonable interpretation is that the word "foreign state" means the sovereign
state itself. Likewise, the Gates court reached a similar reasonable
interpretation after examining an identical phrase under § 1603(b)(2).
The Act repeatedly regards an "agency or instrumentality" less favorably
than a "foreign state." The exception to jurisdictional immunity of a
foreign state is more narrow than that of an agent or instrumentality
when the issue involves "rights in property taken in violation of
international law." 148 Also, a foreign state, unlike an agency or
instrumentality, is not liable for punitive damages. 149 Under § 1608,
if no special arrangement exists, a plaintiff must serve a foreign state
according to strict international standards or through diplomatic
channels. 150 A litigant can serve an agency or instrumentality of a

145. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(3).
146. 28 u.s.c. § 1391(t)(4).
147. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 32 (1976).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(3). The courts have jurisdiction over a foreign state when
rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that
property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such
property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in
the United States ....
Id.

149. 28 U.S.C. § 1606. "[T]he foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state
except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages
...." Id.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).
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foreign state through less formal manners. 151 Finally, a court can
attach property used by a foreign state for a collllllercial activity if it "is
or was used for the collllllercial activity upon which the claim is based
• • •• " 152
However, an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
engaged in collllllercial activity in the United States may have its
property attached "regardless of whether the property is or was used for
the activity upon which the claim is based." 153
Such dissimilar treatment throughout the Act indicates the term
"foreign state" often refers solely to the sovereign state itself. Congress
did not intend to equate an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"
with a sovereign state. Additionally, the legislative history concerning
§ 1603(b)(2) states that "a majority of the entity's shares or other
ownership interest be owned by a foreign state (or by a foreign state's
political subdivision)." 154 Because the term "political subdivision" is
expressly used and agencies and instrumentalities generally do not have
political subdivisions, "foreign state" as used in§ 1603(b)(2) reasonably
means only the sovereign state itself. Therefore, an agency or instrumentality should derive foreign state status only from a foreign state or
a political subdivision thereof and not from other agencies or instrumentalities.
B.

The Privileges of States

Congress intended to protect foreign sovereigns engaged in public acts
from territorial jurisdiction by enacting the FSIA. Congress further
intended to prevent adverse foreign policy repercussions by extending
the procedural benefits to foreign states engaged in collllllercial acts.
However, the Act also presumes agencies and instrumentalites, regardless
of the nature of their acts, are foreign states. Consequently, many courts
have granted the Act's procedural benefits to tiered entities. 155 Moreover, when a plaintiff fails to meet the Act's procedural hurdles courts
often grant immunity to tiered entities. 156 Thus, the reasons for the

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

28 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.
H.R. REP.
See supra
See supra

§ 1608(b).

§ 1610(a)(2).
§ 1610(b)(2).
No. 94-1487, at 15 (1976).
notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
note 61.
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Act's preference for expanding state privileges must be discovered to
determine whether they currently support the Act's policies.
Section 1603(b) is an awkward artifact of outdated American
Its
perceptions of organizational enterprise and government.
overinclusive structural approach mistakenly attempts to eliminate
unequal treatment among entities from various foreign states due to a
state's internal structure of government and enterprise. 157 The vestigial
view that juristic persons carry out state purposes resulted from the
socialist form of state enterprise and many European countries' use of
state corporations to rebuild after World War II. 158 However, this
fixation on structure at the expense of function unnecessarily provides
tiered entities privileges previously not enjoyed under customary
international law or often even in their own countries. 159 Accordingly,
conferring state status on tiered entities does not support foreign
sovereign immunity policies.
·
Unfortunately, courts have permitted tiering to support foreign policies
which are inappropriate for remote entities. 160 As previously asserted,
the courts' perception that an entity remotely emanating from the state
represents the state itself is a fallacious view. Tiered entities mingle in
the marketplace like private parties. Consequently, a suit upon such an
entity would hardly acerbate a sovereignty's "national nerves." 161
Considering that the largest group of defendants under the FSIA consists
of agents and instrumentalities, 162 "one has to search carefully for

r

157. See Samuel W. Bettwy, Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Foreign Governments:
Act of State, Sovereign Immunity, and The Alien Tort Statutes, 80 AM Soc'Y lNT'L
PROC. 221, 230 (1986).
158. See Wolfgang Friedman, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International
Law, 50 AM. J. lNT'L L. 475, 486 (1956).
159. See Bettwy, supra note 157, at 230. In discussing this anomaly Mr. Feldman,
who assisted drafting the FSIA states: "The drafters made a mistake by bringing stateowned enterprises within the scope of the FSIA.'.' Id.
160. Cf. Molina v. Commission Reguladora Del Mercado De Henequen, 103 A.
397, 399 (N.J. 1918).
The importance of preserving the immunity of sovereigns in order to preserve
the independence of states, the obligation of a sovereign not to degrade the
dignity of his nation by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the
jurisdiction of another, the perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns, the common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse and
interchange of goods and services with each other, are the underlying reasons
for immunity of sovereigns, as stated by Chief Justice Marshall. None of these
reasons are applicable to a commercial corporation, even though it may be a
governmental agency.
Id.
161. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703-04
(1976) (plurality opinion).
162. GORDON, supra note 5, § 6.13, at 6-40.
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cases where the dignity of the foreign state would be offended were
immunity from jurisdiction to be denied." 163
C.

The Rights of Private Parties

Prior to the FSIA, courts sacrificed a private litigant's rights in the
interest of foreign policy. While the Act proposed to balance these
competing interests, § 1603's overinclusiveness continues to disadvantage private parties. Tiering foregoes the private litigants' concerns for
procedural justice without achieving the Act's purpose of protecting and
benefiting only foreign sovereigns.
Jurisdiction over a corporate entity does not confer jurisdiction over
the state because courts exercise a presumption of separateness. An
entity's acts will "normally" not be attributed to the sovereign state.
Tiered entities have an undeniable independence from indirect state
owners. In fact, an entity's independence provides critical advantages
over government bureaucracies. The corporate structure eliminates or
minimizes the need for direct state control. 164 Instrumentalities offer
flexibility, market-focused management, and efficiencies. Instrumentalities act like private entities, compete with private entities, and are treated
like private entities in the marketplace.
Plaintiffs may treat indirectly state-owned entities like private
companies for several reasons. First, when a plaintiff encounters a
corporation, it may not be state-owned. 165 Second, the costs to
determine all owners may be prohibitive for low-probability events. 166
Such costs rise in a world populated with multi-layered enterprises,
temporary strategic alliances, boundaryless companies, and outsourcing.
Third, a plaintiff may reasonably believe an entity can be sued like other
private parties because it is in fact a separate legal personality. Fourth,
a plaintiff may not realize that the FSIA preempts other statutes that

163. Id. § 1.01, at 1-3.
164. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity Part I, 85 COM. L.J. 167, 171 (1980).
165. See supra note 59.
166. Efficient airline passengers will not seek out all entities involved in the
manufacture, maintenance, and flight of their plane. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ill. 1995), ajf'd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
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confer jurisdiction. 167 Finally, an indirectly state-owned entity may
initiate the encounter leaving a plaintiff no "real" choice but to transact
with the foreign entity. 168
In summary, courts, foreign states, and plaintiffs generally regard
tiered entities as separate legal personalities. However, the courts' strict
adherence to tiering, regardless of an owner's nomenclature, prohibits
them from distinguishing between the entity and the state. Once courts
fuse the two, foreign immunity polices override the plaintiff's concerns
for due process and fairness. Courts, therefore, need to differentiate
subsidiary entities from parent owners and determine whether each is a
foreign state, political subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality.
Prohibiting tiering by agencies and instrumentalities will prevent
nonexistent foreign policy concerns from providing tiered entities with
unwarranted protections to the plaintiffs' detriment. 169
D.

International Impact

Courts treat American corporate defendants in the United States less
favorably than tiered foreign entity co-defendants claiming state status.
Foreign courts treat American entities acting abroad less favorably than
American courts treat foreign entities acting here. This results from
§ 1603(b)'s structural approach; a government's majority stock status
confers state status. Structural based tiering places American courts at
odds with international practices. 170
England's State Immunities Act of 1978 presumes immunity does not
attach to separate entities. A separate entity can overcome this
presumption by demonstrating that the act was sovereign in nature. 171

167. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA")
determines a parent corporation's liability strictly based on stock ownership; however,
under the FSIA there is a presumption of separateness between a parent corporation and
its subsidiary. The FSIA preempts COBRA. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457,
1464-65 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995). See also Stephans v.
National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1266, 1230-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling that
McCarran-Fergusan Act, which declares that state laws preempts inconsistent federal
laws regarding insurance regulations, yields to the FSIA).
168. Workers may not have any meaningful choice but to continue to work when
a foreign entity purchases their employer. See Gates, 54 F.3d at 1459.
169. Cf Friedman, supra note 158, at 485. "[C]ourts and writers ... have all too
often failed to recognize that the substitution of a public corporation for the government
itself in international transactions offered an opportunity to avoid the obstacle of
government immunity or other traditional privileges attached to government activities in
international law." Id.
170. See Hoffman, supra note 33, at 554-65 (noting a trend away from status in
Western European countries).
171. Section 14(1)(c) of the State Immunities Act of 1978 states that a "state" does
not include "any entity (hereafter referred to as a 'separate entity') which is distinct from
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Thus, structure is important to deny immunity while function is
important to provide immunity. Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa
take a similar approach. 172 Also, Germany generally denies immunity
to separate entities and France follows a functional approach, examining
the act rather than the entity's structure. 173 In addition, the European
Convention on State Immunity takes the position of non-immunity for
separate juridical entities unless a "sovereign activity" gives rise to the
suit. 174
Prohibiting tiering, as the Gates court did, furthers the Act's goal of
aligning American practices with international practices. Alignment
establishes a base upon which a framework of uniformity, predictability,
and cooperation in international trade and investment can take place.
Furthermore, it promotes fairness by sacrificing the rights of plaintiffs
in American courts no more than they would be in foreign courts.
E.

Separation of Powers

Much has been written about the courts intrusion into foreign policy
matters via their interpretation and application of various sections of the
FSIA. 175 By contrast, until Gates, courts applied § 1603(a)-(b)(3) in
a rote mechanical manner. Nevertheless, courts following the Gates'
interpretation and application will still refrain from encroaching upon the

the executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued."
Section 14(2) continues: "A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United Kingdom if, and only if (a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it
in the exercise of sovereign authority .... " State Immunities Act, 1978, §§ 14(1)(c)(2)(a) (Eng.), reprinted in GORDON, supra note 5, at Appendix C.
172. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREDER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
97 n.15 (1988).
173. Hoffman, supra note 33, at 557-63; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State
Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51, 59 (1992).
174. Dellapenna, supra note 165, at 61. The European Convention on State
Immunity was ratified by Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 60.
175. See generally Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-making in International
Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L
Bus. 461 (1993). For an analysis of how courts should implement a separation of
powers approach when interpreting the FSIA's commercial activity exception, see
Connors, supra note 101.
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Executive's power. There.is no reason to suppose that tiering disputes
will concern major foreign policy issues. 176
However, if a tiering case involves sensitive foreign policy implications the executive can file an amicus brief along with affidavits from
the proper state officials. Courts have thoroughly considered statements
of interests from the Executive Branch. 177 In National Petrochemical
Co. v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 178 the Executive Branch filed a statement of
interest requesting that NPC, a subsidiary of a wholly owned corporation
of Iran, have access to the courts. Likewise, the Executive Department
can provide the court with a statement of interest when foreign policy
dictates that an indirectly owned agency or instrumentality be treated as
a foreign state. It must be remembered, however, that Congress
transferred immunity determinations to the judiciary to remove political
influences. 179
F.

Domestic Impact

Domestic immunity originates from different theoretical grounds than
foreign immunity. 180 Nevertheless, in practice, domestic immunity
decisions have provided guidance to some courts when they resolved

176. See Gould, Inc. v. Penchiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988)
(suit involving interference with employee contract and unfair competition); Gates v.
Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995)
(former employees suing parent company regarding termination and cancellation of
benefits); Straub v. AP. Gren, Inc., 38 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff suing company
for asbestos-related injuries); American West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877
F.2d 793, 7965 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff claiming breach of warranty and negligence
concerning airplane engine fire); Talbot v. Saipem A.G., 835 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Tex.
1993) (worker suing for damages caused by injury aboard a vessel); Trump Taj Mahal
v. Costuzioni Aeronautiche Geovanni, 761 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd, 958
F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826 (1992) (employer seeking recovery
of damages stemming from employee deaths in helicopter crash from aviation entity);
Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultant, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Or. 1990)
(plaintiff claiming breach of contract).
177. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984),
aff'd, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (11th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 404 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987); National Airmotive Corp. v. Government and
State of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1980). One author purposes that the FSIA
should be amended to allow the executive to intervene in cases involving transnational
disputes, frivolous lawsuits, and those involving national security. Hill, supra note 25,
at 202-04.
178. National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989) (the United States did not formally recognize
the government of Iran at the time).
179. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 41.
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foreign immunity questions. 181 In domestic cases, courts have recognized that Americans' displeasure towards government immunity has led
Congress to regularly make United States' entities amenable to suit. 182
Tiering ironically provides indirectly state-owned foreign entities with
greater legal protection in U.S. courts than is given to directly-owned
U.S. government entities. Also, foreign entities often are amenable to
suit in their own countries. 183 Accordingly, sovereign immunity
policies do not justify such disparate treatment. Prohibiting tiering
would accord similar rights to plaintiffs whether they are suing an
American government-owned entity or a foreign state-owned entity. 184

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In considering recommendations, one must keep an important point in
mind: immunity is the exception and not the norm. Examined in this
context, tiering presents two distinct problems. First, if a plaintiff fails
to meet the Act's procedural hurdles a tiered entity will be granted
immunity regardless of the nature of its activities. Second, and more
importantly, while a remote entity will normally not be granted
immunity because of the Act's commercial activity exception, it does
gain the Act's procedural benefits simply because of its tiered ownership
structure.
This Comment proposes two recommendations. First, as long as
§ 1603(a)-(b)(3) remains intact, courts should interpret tiering cases
within the historical context of sovereign immunity. Second, the
legislature should amend§ 1603(a)-(b)(3) to focus less on structure. The
Gates and Rose/awn decisions highlight the absurdity of relying on
tiered ownership to implement the restrictive theory. The Legislature
should amend § 1603 to focus either on control or function.

181. In Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. N.D. 1946); Edlow Intern.
Co. v. Nuklearna Electrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C. 1977); Ulen & Co.
v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 305 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940), appeal
denied, 25 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941).
182. E.g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 318, 390-91
(1939).
183. Bettwy, supra note 157, at 230.
184. Cf. William H. Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts,
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 456 (1970) (U.S. individuals and corporations should have
the same rights against foreign governments as it does against our own government when
actions involve contract and tort damage).
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A.

Historical Context

Pre-FSIA immunity history (both domestic and foreign immunity)
reveals that courts continually refused to extend a sovereign's immunity
to separate legal entities. The Act's legislative history also reveals that
Congress intended to codify the restrictive theory. Under the restrictive
theory, a defendant's acts and not its structure are determinative in
conferring state status. In this context, one views the Gates decision not
as an aberration, but rather in sync with legislative intent and pre-FSIA
case law history.
Courts need to examine tiering disputes not only with knowledge of
the Act's applicable statutes, but also with an understanding of the
history of immunity The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance
of this history in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 185 The
Supreme Court recognized that § 1603(d)'s definition of "commercial
activity" does not in fact define the term. The Court stated that
"[:f]ortunately ... the FSIA was not written on a clean slate." 186 The
Court then interpreted the meaning of "commercial activity" within the
context of the restrictive theory.
Courts should advance the restrictive theory by prohibiting tiering
under § 1603(b). Codifying the restrictive theory is the Act's first
objective. 187 By implementing the Act, Congress did not intend to
change immunity policy, but rather continue the policy articulated in the
Tate letter. Unfortunately, the Act's definitional clause fixes the
threshold question on status for agencies and instrumentalities. Yet,
courts have recognized that Congress "has the power to decide what the
policy of the law shall be, and ... that will should be recognized and
obeyed." 188 Courts should uphold congressional intent by reading
§ 1603(b)(2) narrowly as the Gates court did. 189 The independent and
remote nature of tiered entities diminishes the risk of affronting the
185. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
186. Id. at 612.
187. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
188. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
189. See Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 686-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The
Hyatt court found neither Gates nor Rose lawn interpretations of§ 1603(b)(2) dispositive.
Consequently, the court inferred congressional intent from the following factors: (a) the
prevailing international rule and earlier United States cases; (b) Congress's explicit
inclusion of entities owned by foreign states and political subdivisions; (c) a broad
interpretation would extend state status to remote entities removed from state control;
and (d) the substantial implications of tiering. Consequently, the court concluded that
"Congress intended a narrow interpretation of 'agency or instrumentality,' i.e., that
corporations a majority of whose shares are owned by agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign states are not themselves agencies or instrumentalities." Id. at 688.
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foreign sovereignty. Tieiring reduces the likelihood that the United
States' foreign policy and international trade interests will be embroiled
in the action. Lacking an amendment, only agents and instrumentalities
directly owned by sovereign states and their political subdivisions should
be presumed to be performing acts political in nature.

B.

Structure, Control, and Function

Section 1603(b), and tiering in particular, acts as a poor proxy for
state control by solely focusing on structure. 190 Even for all its length,
the Roselawn analysis breaks down into whether "the structure of
ownership interests ... can support ... foreign state status." 191 This
Comment proposes two possible amendments to § 1603. Both attempt
to balance the three parties' competing concerns: a plaintiff's right to
due process and fairness, a state's right to be free from explaining the
propriety of government activities in a foreign court, and the Executive
Branch's interest in not only protecting· foreign relations, but also
international trade. The amendments justify expanding state status and
potential immunity to agencies or instrumentalities only when either the
state closely controls the entity or the entity performs sovereign acts.
First, Congress can amend § 1603(b)(2) to focus strictly on a
sovereign state or a political subdivision's control over the separate
entity. A foreign state's sovereign interest is arguably stronger in a
closely controlled entity than in a remote entity. Also, foreign policy
issues are arguably more intertwined with a closely controlled entity than
with a remote entity. The Executive Branch's interests, therefore, are
generally stronger when an entity is closely controlled than when it is
not. Consequently, § 1603 would presume only closely controlled
entities are sovereign states.
Under a control approach, courts would consider ownership as only
one criteria when determining "state status." The court took this

190. Linking state control with shares of ownership under § 1603(b)(2) conflicts
with U.S. views of corporate ownership. U.S. laws and passive investments tend to
separate ownership from management control. Comment, Robert E. Benfield, Curing
American Managerial Myopia: Can the German System of Corporate Governance Help?,
17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 615, 619-23 (1995).
191. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (N.D. Ill.
1995), aff'd, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996).
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approach in Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko. 192 The
Edlow court provided the first interpretation of§ 1603(b)(2). The court
looked beyond strict ownership because the defendant was located in a
socialist country which ultimately owned all entities. The court reasoned
that a "state's system of ownership, without more" should not be the
sole reason to designate an entity a state agency or instrumentality. 193
The court, in not conferring state status, noted that the state did not
subsidize, hold board seats, or manage in daily operations. 194 Likewise, the Gates court used a similar approach to determine that the state
Council's "active supervisory role" over Alberta Pork qualified it as a
state agency or instrumentality. 195
The control approach requires that Congress provide the courts with
clear "control" criteria. Fortunately, the courts currently utilize control
factors when determining whether an entity is an "organ of a foreign
state" under§ 1603(b)(2). Courts have focused on the following factors:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose;
(2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity;
(3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays
their salaries;
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the country;
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law. 196

Courts need such criteria to pursue the goals of uniformity and
predictability. Achieving both goals would aid international commerce
by supporting the perception of justice and the stability of transactions.
The control approach, moreover, offers the benefit of eliminating the
obvious non-sovereign cases from the FSIA. Commercial entities whose
sole connection to a state is indirect stock ownership would not receive
any sovereign protections.
The second proposal, though more complex, would align § 1603 closer
to the restrictive theory by implementing a functional approach. Under

192. 441 F. Supp 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
193. Id. at 832. But see Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp.
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Yessenin-Volpin, the plaintiff sued Novosti, a Soviet
information agency. Even though Novosti was a juridical person financially responsible
for its obligations, the court reasoned that a socialist state owns all organizations such
as Novosti. Id. at 854.
194. Edlow Intern. Co., 441 F. Supp. at 832.
195. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
196. Medical Corp. v. McGonigle, No. 96-3737, 1997 WL 45039, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 31, 1997). See also Corporacion Mexicana Servicios Manitimos, S.A. DE C.V. v.
The M/T Respect, 89 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Pemex-Refining, a
subsidiary of Pemex, from FFF in Gates v. Victor Fine Foods because Pemex-Refining
was 100% owned by Pemex, controlled by government appointees, employed only public
servants, and was exclusively in charge of refining and distributing government
property).
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a functional approach, a tiered agency or instrumentality would receive
only the Act's immunity protection when performing a sovereign act.
The Act's presumption of state status would differ for directly owned
entities than for tiered entities. Section 1603 would continue to presume
a directly owned entity is a foreign state. The same policies supporting
state status for closely controlled entities justify treating directly owned
entities as foreign states; the foreign sovereign and the United States'
interests warrant intrusion upon the private party's interest. Such entities
and private party opponents would continue to operate under the FSIA's
current procedural rules. A private party attempting to defeat a claim of
immunity would have to establish a prima facia case that one of the
Act's exceptions to immunity applies. 197
A tiered entity, however, would no longer be presumed to be a foreign
state under § 1603. Removing this presumption presents only a minor
risk to affronting a state's sovereignty because tiered entities do not
possess attributes particular to sovereign states. Their remoteness and
independence removes the mystification of tiered entities as foreign
states above the normal procedures of justice. There is no indication
that suits involving tiered entities will endanger foreign policy or
international trade interests. Consequently, a private party's interest in
due process justifies shifting to tiered entities the costs of legal disputes
that they create.
Under the functional approach, a foreign agency or instrumentality
sued in state court continues to remove the action to federal court
pursuant to § 1441(d), the FSIA's removal clause. This enables the
federal courts to continue to determine the ultimate immunity issue. In
federal court, once a plaintiff, seeking to remand, establishes a prima
facia case that the entity is "tiered," the burden shifts to the defendant
entity. Then, a foreign entity seeking the Act's protections or immunity
must prove either direct ownership or a sovereign act.
To determine direct ownership, a court would decide whether an
entity's parent is a political subdivision or an agency or instrumentality. 198 An entity would establish direct ownership by proving that the
parent is a political subdivision. Then, the parties would continue under
the Act's normal procedural scheme. As noted, direct ownership
justifies the continued presumption of state status and the attendant
197.
198.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
E.g., Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 680-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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procedural benefits. However, an entity failing to prove direct ownership, a tiered entity, carries the burden of proving its acts were sovereign
in nature. 199
Courts would continue to utilize § 16O5(a)(2), the commercial activity
exception, when determining whether the activity in question was
commercial or sovereign?)() A tiered entity involved in an action
"based upon" a "commercial activity" will not receive immunity. The
Supreme Court defined "based upon" as "those elements that, if proven,
would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case."201 It
requires more than a "mere connection with" the commercial activity.202 A commercial activity determination is a question of behavior
and not motive; a court examines the type of action and not the entity's
reasons for the action. The Supreme Court stated that when a sovereign
acts "in the manner of a private player" within the market its acts are
"commercial within the meaning of the FSIA." 203

199. This approach is similar to the approach taken by England's State Immunities
Act for separate entities. See supra note 171.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994) states that immunity will not be granted when
[T]he action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States ... ·.
Id.
201. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993).
202. Id. at 358.
203. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). The Court
reasoned that the private person distinction was the meaning Congress understood the
restrictive theory required at the time it passed the statute. Id. at 612-13. Many
commentators have criticized the commercial activity exceptions and the Court's
interpretation of it. See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception,
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 499-516 (1992) (asserting that interpretations of "commercial
activities" has lead to unpredictable results); Amelia L. McCarthy, The Commercial
Activity Exception-Justice Demands Congress Define a Line in the Shifting Sands of
Sovereign Immunity, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 893 (1994); Jonathan Kaiden, Millen Industries
v. Coordination Council For North American Affairs: Unnecessarily Denying American
Companies Right to Sue Foreign Governments Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 193 (1991); Garvey, supra note 175, at 463-74 (claiming
courts manipulate what constitutes an "act" to conceal political motivations). But see
Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A
Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 302 (1986) (asserting that complex commercial
transactions require a flexible clause and the courts have generally applied it correctly).
Writers have proposed various changes to help guide the courts in their determination
of the nature of an activity. E.g., McCarthy, supra, at 914-23. Under the functional
approach, any changes to the commercial activity exception would be incorporated into
the court's analysis when determining whether the activity was sovereign in nature.
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Courts would grant immunity to tiered entities involved in sovereign
acts not because of their structure, but because of the public nature of
their acts. This approach emphasizes the activity nature of the restrictive
theory. If a tiered entity's activities are not sovereign acts, the federal
court would remand the action to state court. The policies justifying the
extension of the Act's procedural benefits to directly-owned entities do
not warrant an extension to tiered entities.
In summary, § 1603 would continue to grant state status to directlyowned agencies and instrumentalities, but not to tiered entities. Directlyowned agencies or instrumentalities would continue to receive the Act's
procedural protections and possible immunity; tiered entities, however,
would not receive the procedural protections of the Act. Nevertheless,
tiered entities conducting sovereign acts could obtain immunity.
CONCLUSION

Tiering allows the FSIA's protections to unnecessarily metastasize to
remote entities who neither have sovereign attributes or are involved in
sovereign acts. Tiering disputes will only increase as transactional
effects pulse across the synapses of interconnected entities. Courts
confronting tiering questions should not automatically equate an agency
or instrumentality with a foreign state. The Gates court's prohibition
against tiering was a proper interpretation of the language of
§ 1603(b)(2). Furthermore, the ruling supports the policies of sovereign
immunity.
Notwithstanding the Gates ruling, the Legislature should follow the
lead of many other countries and amend§ 1603. A control or functional
approach would place sovereign immunity questions in line with
international practice. Such an amendment would bring the FSIA closer
to the restrictive theory as laid out in the Tate letter. Furthermore, the
proposed amendments distribute the burdens and benefits in a manner
that reflects the strength of the interests involved.
KELLY SHAUL
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